On Childhood, Wildness, and Freedom by Benzaquén, Adriana S.
On Childhood, \Tildness, and Freedom
Adriana S. Benzaqu6n
1. Critical Theory, the Other Child and the Wild Child
In his groundbreaking study of childhood in history, philippe Arids put
forward the provocative claim that childhood did not exist in the Middle
Ages and the Renaissance, and was "discovered" in \Testern societies
during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.l This claim opened up a
heated scholarly controversy, but no one could dispute AriBs'subsequenr
observation that, from the late eighteenth century onward, childhood
increasingly became an object of concern. The progress of childhood,
from non-existence or relative obscurity to cultural obsession, was largely
effected by means of an ongoing project of knowledge-production lead-
ing to the very particular ways in which we know and relate to children
in the present.
The dominant concepr of childhood in the contemporary world is a
scientific concept. The "depth" knowledge about children postulates that
children develop, that this development takes them through a series of
stages which may be scientifically mapped, and that in each srage they
have needs that must be appropriately met to avoid long-term undesirable
effects.2 since their inception in the early nineteenth century, and with
renewed assiduity and authority since the turn of the twentieth century-
with the rise of the two powerful forces of child study and psychoanaly-
sis-the sciences of childhood have proposed different models and spe-
cific contents to flesh out the notions of development, stages, needs, and
long-term effects, but beyond (or underneath) countless surface debates,
these very notions and this general view of the child are tarely questioned.
The dominant knowledge of childhood purports to uphold an under-
standing of "the normal child" clearly distinguished from pathological
childhoods in need of varying degrees of normalizing intervention, yer,
paradoxicallg in relation to the (adult) human standard it also conceives
all children as somehow abnormal or pathological-not-yet-fully-human,
not-yet-developed, adults-to-be. This is one of the reasons why, in the
historical emergence and elaboration of this knowledge, "abnormal,' or
extraordinary children were often privileged as objects of knowledge
presumed to reveal something about all children. Initially devised in the
industrialized countries, the dominant concept of the child has been
exported and lately enforced throughout the world by means of interna-
tional child-aid programs. \Tritten into the 1989 uN convention on the
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Rights of the Child, it now gives universal shape to the normal and desir-
able childhood.
For two-hundred years, children have been at the receiving end of a
project of knowledge-production in which the positions of subject and
object of knowledge (adult and child) are painstakingly distinguished
and hierarchically fixed. The same type of positioning was once common
in the dominant forms of knowledge about other kinds of marginalized
and subordinate people (the primitive, woman, the homosexual, the mad-
man) which are in the process of being contesred, giving rise to political
movements (like feminism) and academic disciplines (like gay and les-
bian studies) that question definitions imposed from outside, and inau-
gurate collective spaces for self-definition. No ma;'or discourse, discipline,
or political movement has yet surfaced in which the subject is the (self-
defining, self-knowing) child. It seems that children, like the class of
French, small peasants described by Marx in The Eighteenth Brumaire
of Louis Bonaparte, cannot represent themselves-at least in the present
conditions of knowledge-production. Children who "know too much"
(or try to represent themselves) risk losing their status as children in the
eyes of adults. Public and academic thinking about childhood is a task
monopolized by adults.
But who are the adults who think about and relate to children in con-
temporary societies? A striking historical correlation, of the formulation of
a scientific understanding of childhood and of children's needs, was a nar-
rowing of socially sanctioned relations between adults and children. Ever
more exclusive and proprietary parent-child relations are complemented
or, when parents are found wanting, supplanted by relations between chil-
dren and professionals of childhood (educators, physicians, caregivers,
social workers, psychologists, psychoanalysts). The tendency is towards
allowing and accepting relations between children and adults only when
they are based on shared blood (or, in more current parlance, shared genes)
or on the adult's expertise. And a striking feature of the contemporary
configuration of discourses on childhood is the lack of a sustained rheoret-
ical reflection on childhood, on the difference between children and adults,
on how the state of being a child affects the experience of being human.
Indeed, most philosophical or theoretical texts ignore childhood alto-
gether. This silence perpetuates the two complementary assumptions that
bolster the dominant view of the child: the disciplinary division of labour
according to which childhood belongs exclusively to science and to spe-
cializations within the traditional disciplines, and rhe naturalization of
childhood as a phenomenon outside or beyond theoretical inquiry.
The divide between children and adults, and the age, rirual, and cognitive
boundaries a child must cross to be promoted to the state of adulthood.
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are defined (and defended) by adults. childhood is defined and existen-
tially constituted as an object of knowledge while children are discur-
sively excluded as subjects of knowledge. since children do not represenr
themselves, since they do not have access to the means of knowledge-pro-
duction, and since it is unthinkable, at least for us, that children might
generate a publicly-recognized theoretical reflection on the category of
childhood and the difference berween children and adults in the same *uy
as other theoretically-inclined members of minorities or marginalized
groups have done or may do, thinking about childhood, like scientific
research on children, must be done by adults.
Then we must wonder, what risks are entailed when the adult seizes the
place of the subject in a discourse about the child? In modern western
societies, "the child" is a double figure: an object known by various disci-
plines and made to participate in social and cultural institutions, but also
a pervasive image in the collective and individual adult imagination. Ever
since Rousseau's pedagogical musings, and Blake's and \fordsworth's
poetry' the image of the child has offered one of the most vigorous em-
bodiments for adult attitudes, beliefs, and desires. ,,The child" stands for
the prelapsarian (or pre-modern) vision of innocence, puritS and unity
with nature. In turn, it encapsulates the modern idea (and lived experi-
ence) of the adult self as a self within, the product of a personal history.3
In this sense-as the adult's lost past 
-childhood does achieve momen-tous theoretical significance, but only as a means to explain adult origins,
to account for how we got to be who we are. The twentieth century's
foremost theory of subjectivitr psychoanalysis, grants childhood a posi-
tion of privilege. But childhood maters in psychoanalysis (and the theo-
ries and therapies that directly or indirectly evolved from it, excepting
perhaps child analysis) as what has been forgorten or repressed and for
this very reason affects the adult in the present and must be remembered,
reconstructed, or recovered through the work of analysis. As its her-
meneutic and therapeutic value rises, childhood recedes into the past or
the timelessness of the unconscious, and the child in th. pr.r.rrt dirup-
pears. As the adult turns her attention inward to her needy inner child,
she turns her eyes away from the child out there. In the present state of
things, children do not represent themselves either discursively or politi-
cally. Adult attempts to represent "the child" run the risk of ,epreserrting
the adult once again, only in a different form: as the child I was, the child
I desire because of a nostalgic attachment to my own lost past.
To move beyond the figures of the child as a defective adult (in per-
petual prepararion to become an adult) and the child within the adult(romanticized or demonized memories of childhood as the time of inno-
cent happiness or of abuse and trauma), I advance the notion of the child
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as other. Otherness is meant to signal both the other person's integrity
and the distance between the other and myself-the distance separating
us, and the distance that makes possible our meeting.a Neither object
nor self-image, the other child would be a separate person with whom
a meaningful, ethical relation may and ought to be established. And to
explore the notion of the other child, I focus on (historical and imaginary)
moments in which the adult is faced by a child who can be neither easily
objectified (explained using the knowledge and categories we usually rely
on in our dealings with children) nor easily assimilated (as a mirror of
ourselves or an explanation of our origins), but remains indisputably dif-
ferent, unfamiliar, strange.
The stories of wild children tell of encounters between adults and strange
children in unusual circumstances and of the responses the children elicited
in the adults. It makes sense to examine these stories in the context of a
critical engagement with childhood and otherness because wild children-
children presumed to have been raised by animals or to have spent a long
period in isolation from other human beings-are unquestionable figures
of otherness, embodiments of radical difference confronting the adult
subject of knowledge. \fhich is not to say that individual wild children
have not been objectified or conflated with the adult self through various
kinds of mechanisms and projections. Still, the encounter with the wild
child as a figure for thought at least promises to bring to the fore the dis-
tance separating the adult and the child and the effort the adult must
make to reduce it (and so to reduce the child's difference).
Wild children-Peter of Hanover, the wild girl of Songi, Victor of Avey-
ron, Kaspar Hauser, Amala and Kamala of Midnapore, Genie, the wild
boy of Burundi, and many others-were located at the centre of concentric
circles of concern, curiosity, and intervention: interpersonal, communal,
social, transnational. They unfailingly attracted interest and attention,
but the meanings they were given and the responses they evoked varied
greatly. In general, the response to the wild child depends on the ques-
tions brought to bear at the moment of the encounter and the knowledge
the adults in charge possess andlor seek. The character of the relation
established between adult and wild child is marked by the adult's specific
conception of who and what the child is. Throughout the eighteenth and
nineteenth century, newly-discovered wild children were "received" by
scientists and administrators as privileged objects of knowledge and inter-
vention. In almost every case, the response to the wild child took the form
of an attempt to transform-humanize, tame, civilize, normalize, educate,
or cure-her or him. Something was always done with/to the child. The
approaches used varied widely, from direct and unashamedly violent
"taming" or training, to more "rational," non-violent, and medicalized
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forms of education, treatment and rehabilitation. The changing response
to the wild child intersects with the historical emergence and increasing
refinement of medical and pedagogical technologies of intervention in all
children's lives.
In the twentierh century, the wild child existed-in discourse, in adults'
imaginations, and perhaps, in reality-mainly in two incarnations: the
wolf child and the confined child. Each of these figures offered adults a
vehicle for fantasy, projection and identification. The children reputedly
reared by wolves and other wild animals in remote corners of the world(Kamala and Amala, John of Burundi) stand at maximum spatial, cul_
tural, and conceptual distance from the civilized adult, and, in their like-
ness to animals, appear to be most estranged from the human condition.
The confined children (Genie) are not found .,far away,, or ,,out there," in
some exotic wilderness, but right here in our midst, in a human-made
environment (dungeon, attic, locked room), and to this minimum spatial
distance (from us) corresponds a maximum of possibilities for psycholog-
ical investment. Unintelligible, almost unthinkable. the wolf child is nor a
figure with whom we can easily identify, but for that very reason it exerts
a special kind of pull on us: the fascination of the exotic, the obscure. the
primitive, the most radically other. In contrast, the confined child pre-
sents us with no mystery, because her or his confined life is one of utmosr
control and immobility. The confined child sitting alone in a dungeon or
locked room, all day, day after day, is an image that troubles us, but
which we have no trouble imagining. And, we have been told, the con-
fined child is in essence an abused child, like, perhaps, most (or all) of us;
it lives in us and discloses our truth, our (past) selves, our inner children.s
There is also a third figure, a third incarnarion of the wild child in the
twentieth century: the "free" wild child, the wild child who remains free.
It is, for the most pafi.) a creature of our imagination and desire-the
desire to leave the wild child alone, to celebrate and preserve the wild
child as wild child.
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2.The Free Wild Child
Go run the ring, run it thin with trespass:
Until we forgive
What we fetter to free ourselves.
O wild child I see you restless in the thorn
And in the burning sky.
Is this my link?
Have I shortened the leash?
Must I lock your eyes onto the mirror
Of my fear, my fear for them.. . ?
lfhere is the chain I broke,
Are my arms wrapped by death?
-J. Fairfax, "The other child?"
As an example of what wild children allow us to think and do, let me
tell you the only story of a free wild child to date. In 1960, Jean-Claude
Auger, a poet, painter, solitary traveller, and explorer, found a boy liv-
ing with a herd of gazelles in the Tiris, then part of the Spanish Sahara.
Unlike all earlier (and later) discoverers of wild children, Auger did not
capture the boy, but rather observed him in his "natural environment"
for almost a month. Th6odore Monod, of the Institut Frangais d'Afrique
Noire at Dakar, pressed Auger to make public the details, at first unsuc-
cessfully. In Auger's reticence Monod sensed an attempt to resist the
scientific exploitation of the wild child: "I understand very well that the
appetite for precision of'observers' such as ourselves irritates you a bit,
because you would be perfectly satisfied with 'the poetic aura' of things."6
But the publication of Lucien Malson's Les Enfants sauuages in 1964, and
the release of Truffaut's L'Enfant sauuage in 1.970, renewed interest in
wild children, and in 197L, A,tger's full account of his encounter with the
gazelle boy appeared under his other name, Jean-Claude Armen.T
Armen marks his unexpected encounter as an "extraordinary experi-
ence. . . the most moving to have befallen me in the course of five years of
travelling round the earth" (17). His first sighting of the boy is a "vision"
of an "unknown, fabulous creature in a world apart" (28). The thought
of capturing him-to transform him into something like what he (Armen)
was-does not cross Armen's mind. He is overwhelmed by the wild boy's
presence, resolved to extricate the spiritual meaning of his existence.
Although this account contains elements common to most accounts of
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wild children (a description of the boy, observations on his life and behav-
iour, conjectures about his origin, and a view of his overall condition), in
crucial ways Armen's response to the boy is peculiar. He does not cover
up the "animal" aspects of the boy's life and behaviour, yet for Armen
this "animality" is neither disgusting nor disturbing. In part, he claims,
this is because of the range of his experience as an exprorer of remote
lands and non-western cultures. Besides, he is enthralled by what he per-
ceives as the gazelle boy's perfect harmony with the herd, with narure,
with the universal order of things. During the weeks he spends with the
herd, Armen tries diverse methods to make contact with the boy: by
means of the gaze, by playing a few notes on a simple flute, which alter a
few days catch the boy's attention, by imitating the gazelles' (and the
gazelle boy's) sniffing and licking, which, he guesses, is .,some kind of
code signifying acknowledgment, contact, and almost recognition" (32).
Through this last method-through his own adoption of gazene behav-
iour-Armen reaches "the transparency and plenitude of a new state. of
a rare 'communicationr"' in what is "a painful moment of extreme inten-
sity . . . an instant of deadlock violence" of the kind that "confers meaning
and value on an existence" (35). His provisions long gone, and having
become "a shadow of myself, surviving only by my passion for the child
and his gazelles," Armen reluctantly leaves "this life which I have been liv-
ing at the boundaries of unreality" (7s,78). Upon his return to Europe he
decides to conceal the boy's precise whereabouts, "for what was at stake
was the safety of a creature still too fragile to defend himself against the
enterprises of men, well-intentioned or otherwise" (80). In spite of Armen's
precautions, American officers of the NATo base of villa cisneros, in the
Rio de oro, tried to capture the gazelle boy in 1966 and in 1970.If they
had succeeded, Armen says, "every American in deepest Texas would have
seen the child on his little screen, stuffed with tranquillizers and, on his
arm) a Hollywood-style native girl darkened with sun-tan, between adver-
tisements for hot dogs and biological washing-powders,' (94).
The figure of the free wild child points to a new attitude ro the wild child
in general. No longer miserable, brutal, and essentially inhuman (deprived
of the essential characteristics of humanity), the free wild child lives in
equilibrium with the environment. The desire to leave the wild child alone
marks a change in the evaluation of the wild child's wild life, and this
change may be seen as the obverse of the \festern, civilized adurt's own
dissatisfaction with civilization and yearning for a different kind of life-
a fuller, more meaningful existence. The free wild child thus offers a new
channel for the expression of the anti-civilization sentiments which have
been a strong undercurrent in the \fest since at least the industrial revolu-
tion. Armen, writing when the nineteen-sixties counterculture was still on
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the rise, remarks that it would be "senseless" to want to transform the
gazelle boy into "a candidate for our producer-consumer civilization," pre-
cisely at the time "when an increasingly large proportion of the younger
generation is rejecting the 'values' of our \Testern civilization" (93). The
free wild child is inextricable from the notion that, as Freud warned us,
civilization involves constraint, and this constraint is the source of our
discontent. Still, the rcalization that the "uncivilized" may be left to exist
as such, without danger to the civilized subject, is tied, on the one hand,
to the political and philosophical critiques of imperialism and colonialism
(as the project to impose civilization on the other for our own benefit),
and on the other hand, to the simple fact that we are no longer striving to
achieve civilization (to differentiate ourselves from the orher on the basis
of our advanced civilization), but are for better or worse completely in it
-whether we want it or not. From this position, it becomes easier to
identify with the wild child as the embodiment of the self's desire.
Armen argues that knowledge of, and through, the wild child can only
be obtained by living with the wild child in his or her own environment.
Moreover, he declares that the kind of knowledge held by the wild child is
not of the kind that interests scientists but rather of a spiritual revelation.
The free wild child is the civilized adult's guide away from, or beyond,
civilization: "in my innermost self, the wild child whom I discovered by
chance has unexpectedly become, as it were, the point of convergence of
my long and obscure 'quest' for fulfillment across five continents" (95).
Armen not only wants to relate to the gazelle boy, but endeavours to be-
come like the wild child. In this reworked form, the encounter with the
wild child is a transformative experience for the subject. I said before that
the gazelle boy of the Sahara Desert is the only free wild child to date,
and this is not entirely true. The last few years have seen a proliferation of
free wild children in literature and film. Think for instance of the silent
wild boy in David Malouf's novel An Imaginary Life, who encounters
Ovid in exile, becomes the poet's guide and eventually allows him to
experience his own metamorphosis; or the wild woman played by Jodie
Foster in Michael Apted's Ne//, who pleads in court to remain free and
untransformed-and wins. In John Fairfax's poem cycle Vlild Children,
the wild child is the speaker. Captured, the wild child reclaims his or her
identification with animals: "I found them. / They are mine, I am theirs."8
Tamed, trained, civilized, the wild child yearns for freedom: "They come
to me with keys / In their voice, with chains / For hands, with thorn in
their eyes. /They sound me a name.... / O I cannot recall my forest."e
To a great extent the figure of the free wild child emerges in reaction to
the appropriation of wild children by the scientific establishment and for
scientific knowledge-the conviction that scientists should study the wild
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child, transform the wild child, reveal the wild child,s secrets and in so
doing advance our knowledge of the normal child (and our srraregies to
normalize children). But the figure of the free wild child has more tro.r-
bling connotations as well. Armen claims that one of the reasons for his
opposition to the gazelle boy's capture is the "established fact" that chil-
dren who have spent several years in the wild are not ',readaptable" (93).
The desire to leave the wild child alone rhus carries an implicit or explicit
admission of our own limitations: our attempts to ,,rescue,, the wild child
have failed. The fate of most wild children 
-early deaths, lack of recov-
ery, visible unhappiness-shakes our belief in our individual and social
capacity to respond to the child's needs, to restore and console a lost,
abandoned, or suffering child. Rather than a well-overdue recognition of
the child's otherness, the desire to leave the child alone may be a silent
confession of the adult's inability or unwillingness ro commir fully to the
other child who demands from the adult not normarizing, but meaningful
and ethical interventions.
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